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Abstract—In the splitting model, information theoretic authen-
tication codes allow non-deterministic encoding, that is, several
messages can be used to communicate a particular plaintext.
Certain applications require that the aspect of secrecy should
hold simultaneously. Ogata–Kurosawa–Stinson–Saido (2004)
have constructed optimal splitting authentication codes achieving
perfect secrecy for the special case when the number of keys
equals the number of messages. In this paper, we establish a
construction method for optimal splitting authentication codes
with perfect secrecy in the more general case when the number
of keys may differ from the number of messages. To the best
knowledge, this is the first result of this type.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of quantum computer resistant cryp-
tographic schemes and security technologies is of crucial
importance for maintaining cryptographic long-term security
and/or confidentiality of digital data, as classical cryptographic
primitives such as RSA, DSA, or ECC would be easily
broken by future quantum computing based attacks (e.g., [1],
[2]). Application areas where cryptographic long-term security
and/or confidentiality is strongly required include archiving
official documents, notarial contracts, court records, medical
data, state secrets, copyright protection as well as further areas
concerning e-government, e-health, e-publication, et cetera.
To this end, one promising approach is the design of infor-
mation theoretic authentication and secrecy systems (e.g., [3],
[4]). The information theoretic, or unconditional, security
model does not depend on any complexity assumptions and
hence cannot be broken given unlimited computational re-
sources. This guarantees not only resistance against future
quantum computing based attacks but also perfect security in
the classical world.
This paper considers authentication and secrecy codes in the
splitting model. Splitting is of importance, for instance, in the
context of authentication with arbitration [5] (i.e., protection
against insider attacks in addition to outsider attacks). Ogata–
Kurosawa–Stinson–Saido [6] have constructed optimal split-
ting authentication codes with perfect secrecy for the special
case when the number of keys equals the number of messages.
In this work, we develop a construction method for optimal
splitting authentication codes with perfect secrecy in the more
general case when the number of keys may differ from the
number of messages. To the best knowledge, this is the first
result of this type. Our simple yet powerful approach is based
on the notion of cyclic splitting designs and establishes an
efficient method to construct optimal splitting authentication
codes with perfect secrecy.
II. THE SPLITTING MODEL
We rely on the information theoretical, or unconditional
secure, authentication model developed by Simmons (e.g., [7],
[8]). Our notation follows [6], [9], [10]. In this model, three
participants are involved: a transmitter, a receiver, and an
opponent. The transmitter wants to communicate information
to the receiver via a public communications channel. The
receiver in return would like to be confident that any received
information actually came from the transmitter and not from
some opponent (integrity of information). The transmitter and
the receiver are assumed to trust each other. An authentication
code is sometimes called, for short, an A-code.
Let S denote a finite set of source states (or plaintexts), M
a finite set of messages (or ciphertexts), and E a finite set of
encoding rules (or keys). Using an encoding rule e ∈ E , the
transmitter encrypts a source state s ∈ S to obtain the message
m = e(s) to be sent over the channel. The encoding rule is
communicated to the receiver via a secure channel prior to
any messages being sent. When it is possible that more than
one message can be used to communicate a particular source
state s ∈ S under the same encoding rule e ∈ E , then the
authentication code is said to have splitting. In this case, a
message m ∈M is computed as m = e(s, r), where r denotes
a random number chosen from some specified finite set R. If
we define
e(s) := {m ∈M : m = e(s, r) for some r ∈ R}
for each encoding rule e ∈ E and each source state s ∈ S,
then splitting means that |e(s)| > 1 for some e ∈ E and
some s ∈ S. In order to ensure that the receiver can decrypt
the message being sent, it is required for any e ∈ E that
e(s) ∩ e(s′) = ∅ if s 6= s′. For a given encoding rule e ∈ E ,
let
M(e) :=
⋃
s∈S
e(s)
denote the set of valid messages. A received message m will
be accepted by the receiver as being authentic if and only if
m ∈ M(e). When this is fulfilled, the receiver decrypts the
message m by applying the decoding rule e−1, where
e−1(m) = s if m = e(s, r) for some r ∈ R.
A splitting authentication code is called c-splitting if
|e(s)| = c
for every encoding rule e ∈ E and every source state s ∈ S .
We note that an authentication code can be represented alge-
braically by a |E|×|S| encoding matrix with the rows indexed
by the encoding rules e ∈ E , the columns indexed by the
source states s ∈ S, and the entries defined by aes := e(s).
We address the scenario of a spoofing attack of order i
(cf. [11]): Suppose that an opponent observes i ≥ 0 distinct
messages, which are sent through the public channel using the
same encoding rule. The opponent then inserts a new message
m′ (being distinct from the i messages already sent), hoping to
have it accepted by the receiver as authentic. The cases i = 0
and i = 1 are called impersonation game and substitution
game, respectively.
For any i, we assume that there is some probability dis-
tribution on the set of i-subsets of source states, so that any
set of i source states has a non-zero probability of occurring.
For simplification, we ignore the order in which the i source
states occur, and assume that no source state occurs more
than once. Given this probability distribution on the set S
of source states, the receiver and transmitter also choose a
probability distribution on the set E of encoding rules, called
an encoding strategy. It is assumed that the opponent knows
the encoding strategy being used. If splitting occurs, then
the receiver/transmitter will also choose a splitting strategy to
determine m ∈ M, given s ∈ S and e ∈ E (this corresponds
to non-deterministic encoding). The transmitter/receiver will
determine these strategies to minimize the chance of being
deceived by the opponent. The deception probability Pdi
denotes the probability that the opponent can deceive the
transmitter/receiver with a spoofing attack of order i.
III. COMBINATORIAL SPLITTING DESIGNS
The notion of splitting balanced incomplete block designs
and, more generally, that of splitting t-designs have been
introduced in [6] and [10], respectively.
Definition 1: For positive integers t, v, b, c, u, λ with t ≤ u
and cu ≤ v, a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ) splitting design D is a pair
(X,B), satisfying the following properties:
(i) X is a set of v elements, called points,
(ii) B is a family of l-subsets of X , called blocks, such that
every block Bi ∈ B (1 ≤ i ≤ |B| =: b) is expressed as
a disjoint union
Bi = Bi,1 ∪ · · · ∪Bi,u
with |Bi,1| = · · · = |Bi,u| = c and |Bi| = l = cu,
(iii) every t-subset {xm}tm=1of X is contained in exactly λ
blocks Bi = Bi,1 ∪ · · · ∪Bi,u such that
xm ∈ Bi,jm (jm between 1 and u)
for each 1 ≤ m ≤ t, and j1, . . . , jt are mutually distinct.
We summarize some basic conditions concerning the exis-
tence of splitting designs (cf. [6], [10]).
Proposition 1: Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ)
splitting design, and for a positive integer s ≤ t, let S ⊆ X
with |S| = s. Then the number of blocks containing each
element of S as per Definition 1 is given by
λs = λ
(
v−s
t−s
)
ct−s
(
u−s
t−s
) .
In particular, for t ≥ 2, a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ) splitting design is
also an s-(v, b, l = cu, λs) splitting design.
Proposition 2: Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ)
splitting design. Let r := λ1 denote the number of blocks
containing a given point. Then the following holds:
(a) bl = vr.
(b)
(
v
t
)
λ = bct
(
u
t
)
.
(c) rct−1(u− 1) = λ2(v − 1) for t ≥ 2.
Proposition 3: Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ)
splitting design. Then
λ
(
v − s
t− s
)
≡ 0
(
mod ct−s
(
u− s
t− s
))
for each positive integer s ≤ t.
Proposition 4: If D = (X,B) is a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ) split-
ting design with t ≥ 2, then
b ≥
v
u
.
IV. OPTIMAL SPLITTING AUTHENTICATION CODES
We state lower bounds on cheating probabilities for splitting
authentication codes (cf. [12], [13]).
Theorem 1: In a splitting authentication code, for every 0 ≤
i ≤ t, the deception probabilities are bounded below by
Pdi ≥ min
e∈E
|M(e)| − i ·maxs∈S |e(s)|
|M| − i
.
A splitting authentication code is called t-fold secure
against spoofing if
Pdi = min
e∈E
|M(e)| − i ·maxs∈S |e(s)|
|M| − i
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
We indicate a lower bound on the size of encoding rules for
splitting authentication codes (see [10], and [14], [15] for the
case t = 2).
Theorem 2: If a splitting authentication code is (t− 1)-fold
secure against spoofing, then the number of encoding rules is
bounded below by
|E| ≥
t−1∏
i=0
|M| − i
|M(e)| − i ·maxs∈S |e(s)|
.
A splitting authentication code is called optimal if the
number of encoding rules meets the lower bound with equality.
Corollary 1: In a c-splitting authentication code,
Pdi ≥
c(|S| − i)
|M| − i
for every 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
Corollary 2: If a c-splitting authentication code is (t− 1)-
fold secure against spoofing, then
|E| ≥
(
|M|
t
)
ct
(
|S|
t
) .
Optimal splitting authentication codes can be characterized
in terms of splitting designs (see [10], and [6] for the case
t = 2) as follows.
Theorem 3: Suppose there is a t-(v, b, l = cu, 1) splitting
design with t ≥ 2. Then there is an optimal c-splitting
authentication code for u equiprobable source states, having
v messages and
(
v
t
)
/[ct
(
u
t
)
] encoding rules, that is (t − 1)-
fold secure against spoofing. Conversely, if there is an optimal
c-splitting authentication code for u source states, having v
messages and
(
v
t
)
/[ct
(
u
t
)
] encoding rules, that is (t− 1)-fold
secure against spoofing, then there is a t-(v, b, l = cu, 1)
splitting design.
V. OPTIMAL SPLITTING AUTHENTICATION CODES WITH
PERFECT SECRECY
In what follows, we are interested in optimal splitting au-
thentication codes that simultaneously achieve perfect secrecy.
According to Shannon [16], an authentication code is said to
have perfect secrecy if
pS(s|m) = pS(s)
for every source state s ∈ S and every message m ∈M, that
is, the a posteriori probability that the source state is s, given
that the message m is observed, is identical to the a priori
probability that the source state is s.
By introducing the notion of an external difference family
(EDF) (which yields a certain type of a splitting design),
Ogata–Kurosawa–Stinson–Saido [6, Thm. 3.4] have given a
construction scheme for optimal splitting authentication codes
with perfect secrecy in the special case when the number of
keys equals the number of messages.
Theorem 4: Suppose there exists a (v, c, 1) u-EDF over an
Abelian group of order v, then there is an optimal c-splitting
authentication code for u equiprobable source states, having v
messages and v encoding rules, that is one-fold secure against
spoofing and simultaneously achieves perfect secrecy.
An example is as follows (cf. [6, Exs. 2.3 & 5.2]).
Example 1: An optimal 2-splitting authentication code for
u = 2 equiprobable source states, having v = 9 messages
and b = 9 encoding rules, that is one-fold secure against
spoofing and achieves perfect secrecy can be constructed from
a 2-(9, 9, 4 = 2× 2, 1) splitting design. Each encoding rule is
used with probability 1/9. An encoding matrix is given in
Table I.
TABLE I
SPLITTING AUTHENTICATION CODE WITH PERFECT SECRECY FROM A
2-(9, 9, 4 = 2× 2, 1) SPLITTING DESIGN.
s1 s2
e1 {1,2} {3,5}
e2 {2,3} {4,6}
e3 {3,4} {5,7}
e4 {4,5} {6,8}
e5 {5,6} {7,9}
e6 {6,7} {8,1}
e7 {7,8} {9,2}
e8 {8,9} {1,3}
e9 {9,1} {2,4}
In the following, we develop a construction method for
obtaining optimal splitting authentication codes with perfect
secrecy in the more general case when the number of keys
may differ from the number of messages:
(1) We first introduce the notion of a cyclic splitting design.
Let D = (X,B) be a 2-(v, b, l = cu, λ) splitting design,
and let σ be a permutation on X . For a block Bi =
{Bi,1, . . . , Bi,u} ∈ B given as in (ii) of Definition 1,
define Bσi := {Bσi,1, . . . , Bσi,u}, satisfying
Bσi = B
σ
i,1 ∪ · · · ∪B
σ
i,u
with
∣∣Bσi,1∣∣ = · · · = ∣∣Bσi,u∣∣ = c and |Bσi | = l = cu. If
Bσ := {Bσi : Bi ∈ B, 1 ≤ i ≤ b} = B, then σ is called
an automorphism of D. If there exists an automorphism
σ of order v, then D is called cyclic. In this case, the
point-set X can be identified with Zv , the set of integers
modulo v, and σ can be represented by σ : j → j + 1
(mod v). For a block Bi = {Bi,1, . . . , Bi,u}, the set
Bi + j := {Bi,1 + j (mod v), . . . , Bi,u + j (mod v)}
for j ∈ Zv is called a translate of Bi, and the set of
all distinct translates of Bi is called the orbit containing
Bi. If the length of an orbit is v, then the orbit is said
to be full, otherwise short. A block chosen arbitrarily
from an orbit is called a base block (or starter block).
For a cyclic 2-(v, b, l = cu, 1) splitting design to exist,
a necessary condition is v ≡ 1 or l (mod u(u − 1)c2).
When v ≡ 1 (mod u(u− 1)c2) all orbits are full.
(2) Let us assume that there exists a cyclic 2-(v, b, l = cu, 1)
splitting design without short orbit. Then, by Theo-
rem 3, there is an optimal c-splitting authentication code
for u equiprobable source states, having v messages
and
(
v
2
)
/[c2
(
u
2
)
] encoding rules, that is one-fold secure
against spoofing. Furthermore, when considering the
corresponding b×u encoding matrix, it follows by con-
structional reasons from the underlying cyclic splitting
design without short orbit that the code simultaneously
achieves perfect secrecy under the assumption that the
encoding rules are used with equal probability.
Hence, we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 5: Suppose there is a cyclic 2-(v, b, l = cu, 1)
splitting design without short orbit (that is, it holds that
v ≡ 1 (mod u(u− 1)c2)). Then there is an optimal c-splitting
authentication code for u equiprobable source states, having
v messages and
(
v
2
)
/[c2
(
u
2
)
] encoding rules, that is one-fold
secure against spoofing and simultaneously achieves perfect
secrecy.
Relying on some recent constructions of splitting designs
(cf. [17, Sect. 3.2]), we give exemplarily a series of optimal
splitting authentication codes with perfect secrecy.
Example 2: (i) An optimal 2-splitting authentication
code for u = 2 equiprobable source states, having
v = 17 messages and b = 34 encoding rules, that is one-
fold secure against spoofing and achieves perfect secrecy
can be constructed from a cyclic 2-(17, 34, 4 = 2× 2, 1)
splitting design with base blocks {{1, 2}, {3, 5}} and
{{1, 2}, {11, 13}}. Each encoding rule is used with
probability 1/34. An encoding matrix is given in Ta-
ble II.
(ii) As generalization of (i), an optimal c-splitting authen-
tication code for u = 2 equiprobable source states,
having v = 2c2n + 1 messages and b = (2c2n + 1)n
encoding rules, that is one-fold secure against spoofing
and achieves perfect secrecy can be constructed from a
cyclic 2-(2c2n+ 1, (2c2n+ 1)n, l = c× 2, 1) splitting
design with base blocks {{1, 2, . . . , c}, {2c2h − (2c2 −
c)+ 1, 2c2h− (2c2− c)+ c+1, . . . , 2c2h− (2c2− c)+
c(c− 1) + 1}} for all 1 ≤ h ≤ n .
(iii) Further examples of splitting authentication codes with
perfect secrecy, also for u > 2, can be obtained in the
same way from various further constructions of splitting
designs in [17, Sect. 3.2].
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